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Abstract
Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identi￿cation of model primitives
for ￿rst-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-speci￿c,
unobservable sets of potential bidders.
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1 Introduction
Identi￿cation in auctions has been an active area of recent research in industrial organi-
zation. Beginning with the seminal contributions of Guerre et al. (2000) and Athey and
Haile (2002), the literature has explored nonparametric identi￿cation of a variety of auction
models under progressively weaker assumptions on observables.1
We contribute to this literature by showing nonparametric identi￿cation for ￿rst-price
auctions with a binding reserve price r where the set of potential bidders varies from auction
to auction and is unobservable. It is unobservable because those potential bidders whose
valuations are lower than the reserve price r do not bid (enter). The entry probability then
is the probability that the bidder’s valuation exceeds r. We assume independent private
values (IPV). The model allows for ex-ante asymmetries among bidders. Speci￿cally, we
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1See also a recent book by Paarsch et al. (2006).
1assume that bidders may belong to di￿erent groups.2 We assume that only auctions that
have attracted at least one actual bidder are observable.3
We show that the distribution of valuations is identi￿ed in the region above the reserve
price, and the distribution of the numbers of potential bidders is also identi￿ed. Essentially,
we treat the number of potential bidders as an auction-speci￿c e￿ect. As in Paarsch (1997)
and Athey et al. (2004), our basic identifying assumption is that the distribution of bidders’
valuations does not depend on the numbers of potential bidders.
To illustrate the idea of our identi￿cation method, consider a symmetric setting. (We
allow asymmetry in our analysis.) Notice that in one special case the number of potential
bidders is observable. This case occurs when the number of actual bidders is maximal, n =
￿ N. If this is the case, we can identify the distribution of valuations conditional on entry
using standard methods, as in Guerre et al. (2000). But the fundamental parameter of
interest is the unconditional distribution. Our trick is to notice that, when the number of
actual bidders is n = ￿ N ￿ 1 so that the distribution of bids G
￿
￿jn = ￿ N ￿ 1
￿
is a mixture
of two components. The ￿rst component is the distribution of bids conditional on the
number of potential bidders N = ￿ N, and the second is the distribution of bids conditional
on N = ￿ N ￿ 1. The mixture weights are the probabilities of N = ￿ N and N = ￿ N ￿ 1,
conditional on the number of actual bidders n = ￿ N ￿1. Using a theoretical results that the
upper bounds of bid supports are ordered (also proved in the paper), we show that these
mixture weights are identi￿ed. They in turn identify the entry probability for every bidder.
Once this is shown, we are able to identify the distribution of N, despite the fact that only
the auctions that have attracted at least one actual bidder are observable. Combining our
approach with the methods in Berman (1963), and in Athey and Haile (2002), we extend
our results to Dutch auctions where only the winning bids are observable.
Hu and Shum (2007), in a paper that is closely related and was concurrently written,
consider identi￿cation and estimation of a model similar to ours. The main di￿erence is
that they allow the distribution of valuations to depend on the number of potential bidders.
(Another di￿erence is that they restrict attention to a symmetric model.) They show that
identi￿cation nevertheless obtains provided an instrument is available that exogenously
determines the number of potential bidders. Their methods are based on recent results in
the literature on misclassi￿ed regressors and are di￿erent from ours.
Several other papers in the empirical auction literature are related to our paper. Paarsch
(1997), in his study of the Small Business Forest Enterprise Program (SBFEP) in British
Columbia, estimates that the average number of actual bidders is about 3.29. Due to non-
participation caused by a binding reserve price, the number of potential bidders exceeds
the number of actual bidders. But if one uses a crude measure of the number of potential
bidders such as the number of ￿rms registered in the district of the auction, the number of
potential bidders could be as high as 185. Clearly, with this measure, one would substan-
tially overestimate the level of potential competition in the majority of auctions. Paarsch
(1997) adopts a clever parametric estimation strategy that is based on conditional likeli-
hood and eliminates the need to estimate the number of potential bidders. However, his
approach is limited to ascending-bid (English) auctions.
2This approach is adopted in Athey et al. (2004), Flambard and Perrigne (2006), Krasnokutskaya and
Seim (2007) and Hubbard and Paarsch (2008).
3See Hendricks and Porter (2005) for a discussion of the empirical relevance of this assumption.
2Most of the papers that estimated ￿rst-price auctions approached the measurement of
potential competition empirically. In some cases, such a measure is readily available. For
example, in highway procurement auctions conducted by state departments of transporta-
tion, the list of eligible ￿rms is sometimes publicly released and can serve as a good proxy
for potential competition (e.g. Li and Zheng (2006), Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2007) and
Marmer et al. (2007)). In other cases, researchers have used geographic proximity as a
basis for ￿rm inclusion in the set of potential bidders (Athey et al. (2004), Hendricks et al.
(2003)).
Since the structural auction estimates are sensitive to the measure of potential compe-
tition (Hendricks and Porter, 2005), another approach is to treat the number of potential
bidders as a parameter to be estimated, as in La￿ont et al. (1995). Ideally, this parameter
would be auction speci￿c, so a model for potential competition would be estimated jointly
with the model of bidding. Nonparametric identi￿cation of the entire model is necessary
as a foundation for such an approach, and our results provide such a foundation.
Song (2005) and Adams (2007) consider identi￿cation and estimation of eBay auctions
with an unknown number of potential bidders. Similar to us, both papers use the identifying
assumption that the distribution of bidders’ valuations does not depend on the number of
potential bidders N. But their methods are tailored for eBay auctions and are entirely
di￿erent from ours. Song (2005) shows that the joint distribution of any two order statistics
identi￿es the parent distribution. She then applies this result to eBay auctions, by arguing
that in equilibrium, the second and third highest bidders bid truthfully. She develops
a nonparametric estimator based on her identi￿cation result. Adams (2007) shows that,
under certain additional assumptions, observing just the transaction price is su￿cient for
identi￿cation.
2 The model
We consider IPV ￿rst-price auctions. Bidders are ex-ante asymmetric: we assume that
there are m groups of bidders. Within each group the bidders draw valuations from the
same distribution Fi, but the distributions Fi may be di￿erent across the groups. The set
of groups is denoted as M ￿ f1;2;￿￿￿ ;mg. The number of potential bidders in group i is
denoted as Ni, and we sometimes use the notation N ￿ (N1;￿￿￿ ;Nm). We refer to such an
auction as N-auction. Our most important identifying assumption is that the distribution
of valuations does not depend on the composition of bidder groups. (In the symmetric case,
this is equivalent to the requirement that the distribution of bidders’ valuations does not
depend on the number of potential bidders.)
Assumption 1 The distributions of bidders’ valuations do not depend on N, i.e. 8N;N0 2
Zm
+ with Ni;N0
i > 0 we have Fi (vjN) = Fi (vjN0) ￿ Fi (v).
This assumption rules out cases when the decision to become a potential bidder is corre-
lated with the would-be bidder’s valuation, for example. We assume that each distribution
Fi has the same support, denoted as [v; ￿ v], and has density fi which is bounded away from
3zero on its support.4. In this setting, Maskin and Riley (2000) and Lebrun (1999) have
shown existence and uniqueness of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bidding strategies Bi (￿jN).5
These results imply that bidders from the same group must use identical bidding strategies.
From the econometrician’s point of view, N is randomly drawn from some probability
distribution p and is unobservable. In other words, N is treated as an auction-speci￿c
e￿ect. The support of p is denoted as S, i.e. p(N) > 0 if and only if N 2 S. We also make
the following assumption.
Assumption 2 For every group i 2 M, there exists some N 2 S such that Ni ￿ 2. More
succinctly, [N2S fi : Ni ￿ 2g = M.
Without this assumption, we cannot guarantee that equilibrium bidding strategies are
strictly increasing on [r; ￿ v], at least in some auction, for all groups, so that identi￿cation of
Fi (v) for v 2 [r; ￿ v] might fail.6
Nonparticipation in the auction is due to the existence of a binding reserve price r 2
(v; ￿ v). We assume that the numbers of potential bidders in each auction are unobservable:
only the bidders with valuations at least as high as the reserve price r submit serious
bids. We treat non-serious bids as uninformative and ignore them. From now on, it will
be assumed that every bidder submits a bid only if his valuation is at least r, thereby
becoming an actual bidder. The decision to become an actual bidder is called the entry
decision. Only the auctions that have attracted at least one actual bidder are assumed to
be registered in the dataset.
We assume that in each auction, the econometrician observes the bid of every actual
bidder. The identity of each bidder is also observable, implying that its group is known.
This implies that the vector n ￿ (n1;￿￿￿ ;nm) of the numbers of actual bidders in each
group, is observable if
Pm
i=1 ni > 0. Denote the C.D.F. of bids from a group i bidder,
conditional on entry and the vector of potential bidders N, as G￿
i (￿jN) (Ni > 0). Since
N is unobservable, the data do not reveal this C.D.F. They only reveal the C.D.F. of bids
conditional on the numbers of actual bidders Gi (bjn) (ni > 0).
A bidder from group i becomes active if v ￿ r, i.e. with probability 1 ￿ Fi (r). Since











Ni￿ni (n ￿ N): (1)





4Identical supports is a standard assumption in the theoretical literature on asymmetric auctions. See
e.g. Lebrun (1999).
5See also Bajari (2001).
6See Lebrun (1999) and our Appendix for details.
4Since the econometrician only observes the auctions with at least one active bidder, the












The primitives that we seek to identify are Fi (￿) for every i 2 M, and p(N) for every
N 2 S. Before we turn to our results, consider the case when N is observable. Then the
distribution G￿
i (￿jN) and the p(N) are also observable, and we can identify Fi (r) from e.g.
Prfni = 1jNg = Ni (1 ￿ Fi (r))Fi (r)
Ni￿1 :
The distributions Fi (vjv ￿ r) can be identi￿ed from ￿rst-order equilibrium conditions fol-
lowing the approach of Guerre et al. (2000).7 Denote inverse bidding strategies as ￿i (bjN).
If b > r and Ni > 0, the inverse bidding strategies ￿i (bjN) can be found from the ￿rst-order
conditions8




















Fj (￿j(bjN)) = (1 ￿ Fj (r))G￿
j (bjN) + Fj (r) for every j 2 M:
This leads to the identi￿cation of group i’s bidding strategy Bi (vjN) for v > r, and
consequently of the distribution of valuations Fi (vjv ￿ r) = G￿
i (Bi (vjN)jN). Since Fi (r)
is identi￿able, so is Fi (v) for v ￿ r:
Fi (v) = [1 ￿ Fi (r)]Fi (vjv ￿ r) + Fi (r) (v > r):
When N is unobservable, the distributions G￿
i (￿jN) are in general also unobservable,
but there are special cases in which they are observable. Let ￿ S be the set of maximal
elements of S, i.e.9
￿ S ￿
￿ ￿ N 2 S : @N 2 S s.t. ￿ N < N
￿
:
A typical element of ￿ S is denoted as ￿ N. When the number of actual bidders is maximal,
i.e. n = ￿ N for some ￿ N 2 ￿ S, obviously G￿






is identi￿able for all ￿ N 2 ￿ S and i such that ￿ Ni > 0. These special
cases are su￿cient to cover every bidder because, clearly, [ ￿ N2￿ S
￿
i : ￿ Ni > 0
￿
is equal to
7See also the discussion in Athey and Haile (2005).
8For the derivation of (3), see Appendix.
9We use the convention that: for any two vectors x1 and x2 of the same dimension, x1 < x2 means
x1 ￿ x2 and x1 6= x2.
5[N2S fi : Ni > 0g, which is in turn equal to M. Our discussion of the observable N case
then implies that Fi (vjv ￿ r) are identi￿ed for all i 2 M.
It remains to show that Fi (r) and p(N) are identi￿able. Denote the support of group





(Recall that, even though bidders draw their valuations from distributions that may be
di￿erent, the upper bounds of the supports are common for all bidders.) Our identi￿cation
proof will rely on the following lemma.
Lemma 1 ￿ b(N) is strictly increasing in N.
It is well known that Lemma 1 always holds in a symmetric model, i.e. when bidders
draw their valuations from the same distribution. In the Appendix, we prove it in general.
The set ￿ S is identi￿able because it is also the set of maximal numbers of actual bidders.
The bounds ￿ b
￿ ￿ N
￿




and the bound ￿ b
￿ ￿ N
￿





result is the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Given Assumptions 1 and 2, Fi (r) and p(N) are identi￿able.
Proof. It is convenient to denote the conditional distribution of N ￿ n given n as





Fix an arbitrary group i 2 M. Pick an ￿ N 2 ￿ S such that ￿ Ni > 0. We ￿rst show that
￿















































. It follows that
￿
￿ ￿ Nj ￿ N￿i
￿
= lim










6We now show how to recover Fi (r) from ￿
￿ ￿ Nj ￿ N￿i
￿
. First note that
￿





[1 ￿ Fi (r)]
￿ Ni ;
￿
￿ ￿ N￿ij ￿ N
￿
= ￿ Ni (1 ￿ Fi (r))
￿ Ni￿1 Fi (r) ￿
Y
j6=i




1 ￿ Fi (r)
￿
￿ ￿ Nj ￿ N
￿
:
Then from (4), taking into account (1),
￿














1 ￿ Fi (r)
￿







We can combine this equation with
￿












to eliminate p(N). This yields
Fi (r)



















￿￿ ￿ ￿ N￿i
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ N
￿ ;
and therefore (7) implies
Fi (r)





￿ ￿ Nj ￿ N￿i
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ N￿i
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ N
￿ : (8)
Since the right-hand side of this equation contains only identi￿able quantities, Fi (r) is
identi￿able for each i 2 M.
Finally, we can recover p(N) from the total probability equations. For ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿(0),




￿ (njN)p(N) = 0: (9)
Since Fi (r) are identi￿able, ￿ (njN) are also identi￿able; see (1). Formally, consider the
above system for any ￿ 2 (0;1). Write p(N) as P (N;￿) to make the dependency on ￿
explicit. Since the probabilities P (N;￿) enter the right-hand side of (9) only for N ￿ n,
7the system has a recursive structure that allows one to uniquely determine P (N;￿) for all






Next, for any given N = 2 ￿ S, if p(N0;￿) are known for all N0 > N, and we can determine


















To determine ￿, note that as a solution of a liner system, P (N;￿) is homogeneous of degree




P (N;1) = 1;
Since P (N;1) are now known, the above equation uniquely determines ￿(0). Therefore
p(N) is identi￿ed: p(N) = (1 ￿ ￿(0))P (N;1). Q.E.D.
4 Extension to Dutch auctions
In this section, we show that our result generalizes to Dutch auctions, where only the
winning bid is observable. We continue to assume that the identities of actual bidders are
observable. Fix an ￿ N 2 ￿ S. Restrict attention to auctions with n = ￿ N and groups with
￿ Ni > 0. Let Wi be the highest bid submitted from group i (with ￿ Ni > 0). Let W ￿ maxi Wi
be the winning bid. And let I be the identity of the winning group, i.e. W = WI.
Our data directly reveals the joint distribution of (I;W) conditional on n = ￿ N (which
also implies N = ￿ N):
Hi(wj ￿ N) ￿ Pr
￿
I = i & W ￿ wjn = ￿ N
￿
:
Begin by recovering H￿





is related to the set
￿
H￿
i (￿j ￿ N)
￿
via the functional equations






j (tj ￿ N)dH￿
i (tj ￿ N):
One can verify (see Berman (1963) and Athey and Haile (2002)) that the solution for ￿
H￿
























8Since the right-hand side of (12) contains only observable objects, H￿
i (wj ￿ N) is identi￿able.
Now recall that H￿
i (wj ￿ N) is the probability that all ￿ Ni bidders in group i submit bids below
w, conditional on n = N = ￿ N. We have
H￿




￿ ￿ Ni ;
which proves that G￿
i(wj ￿ N) is identi￿able for every ￿ N 2 ￿ S and every i such that ￿ Ni >
0. This implies that ￿i (bjN) and therefore Fi (vjv ￿ r) are identi￿able. The rest of the
identi￿cation proof follows exactly parallel to that of Proposition 1.
5 Concluding remarks
We have shown that a ￿rst-price IPV auction model where nonparticipation is due to a
binding reserve price, and the set of potential bidders is unobservable, is nonparametrically
identi￿ed under weak assumptions. We do not develop a nonparametric estimation method.
This may be an interesting direction for future research. On the other hand, from an empir-
ical perspective, parametric assumptions are always used in some form. Our results provide
a foundation for parametric estimation methods such as in La￿ont et al. (1995) or Donald
and Paarsch (1996), but with auction-speci￿c number of potential bidders. Generalization
to other private value auction models, e.g. with unobserved heterogeneity, either assuming
a￿liated values as in Li et al. (2002) or within the IPV paradigm as in Krasnokutskaya
(2003), is also left for future research.
6 Appendix
This appendix sketches the derivations of equilibrium conditions, and proves Lemma 1. In
order to simplify notations, we do not divide bidders into groups like we do in the text.
The set of bidders is N with 2 ￿ jNj < 1. Each bidder i draws his valuation vi from the
C.D.F. Fi (￿).10
From here up to the proof of Lemma 2 below, we ￿x an N-auction, and thus suppress
the dependency of equilibrium objects on N in our notation, e.g. we write bidder i’s inverse
bidding strategy as ￿i(￿) rather than ￿i(￿jN). But when we prove Lemma 1, this dependency
will become explicit.















where  j(b) ￿ logFj(￿j(b)).
10Clearly, from the theoretical point of view the setting here is equivalent to the one we use in the text,
although they are di￿erent from the econometrician’s point of view.
9Formula (3) in the text follows from (13).




























The above equation holds for b 2 (r;￿ b] where ￿ b is the equilibrium maximum bid. Therefore
















The unique equilibrium is completely characterized by di￿erential equations (15) and the
following boundary conditions:11
￿i(r+) ￿ r for all i, and ￿i(r+) = r except possibly one bidder
￿i(￿ b) = ￿ v for all i.
The proof of Lemma 1 will need the following result.















































i(b) ￿  0
k(b):



















11See Lebrun (1999) for details.
10Since ￿0
k(b) > 0 for all b 2 (r;￿ b] and hence  0
i(b) > 0 as well, we get the result.12 Q.E.D.
Now we can prove Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. It su￿ces to prove￿ b(N) > ￿ b(Nnfkg) for all N with 2 ￿ jNj < 1.
It is trivial if jNj = 2, so suppose jNj ￿ 3. Suppose by the way of contradiction that
￿ b(N) ￿ ￿ b(Nnfkg).
Step 1: We claim that, for small enough " > 0, we have ￿i(bjN) > ￿i(bjNnfkg for all
b 2
￿￿ b(N) ￿ ";￿ b(N)
￿
and all i 2 Nnfkg.




￿ v ￿￿ b
(jNj ￿ 1)fi(￿ v)
<
￿ v ￿￿ b
(jNj ￿ 2)fi(￿ v)
= ￿0
i(￿ bjNnfkg):




and all i 2 Nnfkg.
Suppose not. Then going from ￿ b(N) downward, Step 1 implies that there is a ￿rst




such that ￿i￿(b￿jN) = ￿i￿(b￿jNnfkg) for some i￿ 2 Nnfkg.
Since b￿ is the ￿rst point, we also have ￿j(b￿jN) ￿ ￿j(b￿jNnfkg) for all j 2 Nnfkg.
Then it is easy to verify that Lemma 2 implies ￿0
i￿(b￿jN) < ￿0
i￿(b￿jNnfkg). But then
￿i￿(b￿ + "jN) < ￿i￿(b￿ + "jNnfkg) for small " > 0, contradicting to the de￿nition of b￿.





















and notice that  j(￿ b(N)jN) ￿  j(￿ b(N)jNnfkg) for all j,
X
j2Nnfi;kg
logFj (￿j(r + jN)) >
X
j2Nnfi;kg
logFj (￿j(r + jNnfkg)) 8i 2 Nnfkg:
Therefore, for each i 2 Nnfkg, there is a j 2 Nnfi;kg such that ￿j(r + jN) > ￿j(r +
jNnfkg). It follows that ￿j(r + jN) > ￿j(r + jNnfkg) ￿ r holds for at least two distinct
j’s in Nnfkg, contradicting the boundary condition. Q.E.D.
12The result that ￿
0
k(b) > 0 is stronger than strict monotonicity of ￿k (since ￿k might be 0 at isolated
points). For its proof, see Lebrun (1997) Lemma A2-2.
11References
Adams, C., 2007. Estimating demand from eBay prices. International Journal of Industrial
Organization 25 (6), 1213{1232.
Athey, S., Haile, P., 2002. Identi￿cation of Standard Auction Models. Econometrica 70 (6),
2107{2140.
Athey, S., Haile, P., 2005. Nonparametric Approaches to Auctions. Handbook of Econo-
metrics 6.
Athey, S., Levin, J., Seira, E., 2004. Comparing Sealed Bid and Open Auctions: Theory
and Evidence from Timber Auctions. Department of Economics, Stanford University.
Bajari, P., 2001. Comparing Competition and Collusion: A Numerical Approach. Economic
Theory 18 (1), 187{205.
Berman, S., 1963. Note on Extreme Values, Competing Risks and Semi-Markov Processes.
The Annals of Mathematical Statistics 34 (3), 1104{1106.
Donald, S., Paarsch, H., 1996. Identi￿cation, Estimation, and Testing in Parametric Empir-
ical Models of Auctions within the Independent Private Values Paradigm. Econometric
Theory 12 (3), 517{567.
Flambard, V., Perrigne, I., 2006. Asymmetry in Procurement Auctions: Evidence from
Snow Removal Contracts*. The Economic Journal 116 (514), 1014{1036.
Guerre, E., Perrigne, I., Vuong, Q., 2000. Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price
Auctions. Econometrica 68 (3), 525{574.
Hendricks, K., Pinkse, J., Porter, R. H., 2003. Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding
in ￿rst-price, symmetric, common value auctions. Review of Economic Studies 70 (1),
115{145.
Hendricks, K., Porter, R., 2005. An Empirical Perspective on Auctions.
Hu, Y., Shum, M., 2007. Estimating First-Price Auction Models with Unknown Number of
Bidders: a Misclassi￿cation Approach. Working paper.
Hubbard, T., Paarsch, H., 2008. Investigating bid preferences at low-price, sealed-bid auc-
tions with endogenous participation. International Journal of Industrial Organization.
Krasnokutskaya, E., 2003. Identi￿cation and estimation in highway procurement auctions
under unobserved auction heterogeneity, Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania.
Krasnokutskaya, E., Seim, K., 2007. Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway
Procurement. Tech. rep., working paper.
La￿ont, J., Ossard, H., Vuong, Q., 1995. Econometrics of First-Price Auctions. Economet-
rica 63 (4), 953{980.
12Lebrun, B., 1997. First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case. Working Paper,
Les Cahiers de Recherche du GREEN.
Lebrun, B., 1999. First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case. International
Economic Review 40 (1), 125{142.
Li, T., Perrigne, I., Vuong, Q., 2002. Structural Estimation of the A￿liated Private Value
Auction Model. Rand Journal of Economics 33 (2), 171{193.
Li, T., Zheng, X., 2006. Entry and Competition E￿ects in First-Price Auctions: Theory
and Evidence from Procurement Auctions. Working Paper.
Marmer, V., Shneyerov, A., Xu, P., 2007. What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions?
A Nonparametric Approach. Working Paper.
Maskin, E., Riley, J., 2000. Asymmetric Auctions. Review of Economic Studies 67 (3),
413{438.
Paarsch, H., 1997. Deriving an Estimate of the Optimal Reserve Price: An Application to
British Columbian Timber Sales. Journal of Econometrics 78 (2), 333{357.
Paarsch, H., Hong, H., Haley, M., 2006. An Introduction to the Structural Econometrics of
Auction Data. MIT Press.
Song, U., 2005. Nonparametric Estimation of an eBay Auction Model with an Unknown
Number of Bidders. Working Paper, University of British Columbia.
13